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In this article, we consider the develop-
ment of international relations in the Baltic 
region in the late 20th/early 21st centuries. 
This study aims to analyse the security pro-
spects of the Baltic region in view of the 
changes in the overall geopolitical situation 
in Europe and in the relations between Rus-
sia and its closest neighbours and the lead-
ing NATO countries. 
We examine the ideas and forecasts of 
international and Russian experts relating 
to the state and dynamics of military securi-
ty in the region at the first stage of the Bal-
tics’ membership in NATO. Another focus 
is on changes in the strategy of the NATO 
leadership for the Baltic region as a priority 
zone of potential warfare and, thus, for the 
presence of the alliance in the area. We 
stress that the steps taken by the NATO 
leadership prompted the Russian side to as-
sign a special role in the country’s foreign 
policy to the Kaliningrad region and to take 
practical steps to ensure peace and security 
in the region. 
 
Keywords: international relations, 
cooperation, politics, security, Baltic re-
gion, Russia, Kaliningrad region, USA, 
NATO 
 
Introduction 
 
After the new administration took 
over in the US, media outlets started to 
discuss the possibility of another ‘reset’ 
of the Moscow—Washington relations. 
In September 2017, The Telegraph wrote 
that the Russian side had relayed to the 
new US leadership a ‘roadmap’ sug-
gesting ‘immediate steps to restore 
diplomatic, military, and intelligence 
channels severed between the two 
countries’. The document was reported 
to call for ‘meetings between the two 
countries’ security service heads, con-
sultations on situations in Afghanistan, 
Ukraine, Iran, and North Korea’ [2]. In 
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effect, this allegedly ‘secret’ document was the extended report of the 
Russian International Affairs Council.1 The roadmap did address the 
prospects of the Russian-US strategic partnership across a number of 
areas. However, it never claimed the status of a national programme or 
strategy, being a mere analytical report. The commitment of the parties 
to stronger bilateral relations provoked a reaction even from official 
Beijing. Chinese think-tanks and state media were concerned that ‘the 
scales could be tipping away from Beijing's favour and in a direction 
that could further challenge China's regional and global ambitions’ [3]. 
Despite the euphoria that swept the media waiting for changes in 
the US policy under the 45th President of the US, Donald Trump, ex-
perts argued that the US would still strive for world leadership and 
continue geopolitical confrontation with Russia. Some expected that 
the tension would extend to nuclear armaments as far as to provoke 
nuclear warfare [4]. 
In 2018, the stance of the US towards political dialogue with Rus-
sia remained equivocal. The influence of the American political estab-
lishment on Donald Trump’s position was not always compensated 
by the ambition of the president to secure the economic benefit of his 
country in any dealings with its allies. For example, at the 2018 G7 
summit held in Quebec, Trump said: ‘NATO is as bad as NAFTA.2 
It’s much too costly for the US’. Later, the President’s Press Secretary 
softened this statement, emphasising that Trump was merely calling 
for NATO allies to ‘shoulder their fair share of […] common defense 
burden’ [5]. 
It is very unlikely the US will abandon its leading role in NATO in 
a short-term perspective. However, some decisions of the current 
administration (withdrawal from UNESCO, relocation of the US em-
bassy to Jerusalem, and suspension of the Intermediate-Range Nucle-
ar Forces Treaty) lead one to expect other extraordinary political ini-
tiatives. All this is of special concern to the country’s allies in the Bal-
tic, which, over the past 15 years, have built their military and politi-
cal doctrines on confrontation with Russia. 
 
The countries of the Baltic region on their way to NATO 
 
The international processes taking place today clearly testify to 
the global balance of power shifting towards developing states, as 
well as to the emergence of new centres of power. Thus, the Russian 
                                                     
1 A Roadmap for U.S. — Russia Relations, 2017, Moscow, Russian Interna-
tional Affairs Council; Center For Strategic And International Studies, 
available at: http://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-USA-Roadmap-
Report30-En.pdf (accessed 07.04.2018). 
2 Author’s note: North American Free Trade Agreement. 
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expert community has to focus on describing an optimum form of 
Russia—US relations. To attain this, it is important to analyse the his-
tory of Russia-NATO relations and Russia’s military security objec-
tives in the North-West. The Strategy for the National Security of the 
Russian Federation stresses that, amid growing international instabil-
ity, countries of the world are increasingly assuming responsibility 
for situations in their regions. Regional and subregional trade and 
other economic agreements are becoming an important mechanism to 
prevent crises.3 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
substantiates these assumptions. The document emphasises Russia’s 
commitment to international security and stability at strategic and 
regional levels.4 
The eastward expansion of NATO, which took place in the early 
1990s‒late 2000s, became an essential part of international political 
dialogue. It was often discussed in the context of the situation in the 
Kaliningrad region of Russia — a territory that both plays an im-
portant role in promoting Russian interests in the Baltic and has a 
significant effect on European security in general. This is not surpris-
ing: the geopolitical interests of Germany, Poland, Lithuania, and 
some other European countries overlap in the Baltic region. Accord-
ing to Vladislav Vorotnikov, ‘NATO membership was a top priority 
of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Baltics. On the one hand, it met 
the demands for security of both political elites and the victimised 
public consciousness. On the other hand, it allowed elites to present 
their countries in the international arena as outposts against Russia 
and borderlands between the West and the East’ [6, p. 10]. 
Russian officials and defence experts have often stressed that the 
alliance and its enlargement pose a military threat to the Russian 
Federation [see, for example, 7, p. 98]. Galina Gribanova and Yuri Ko-
sov write: ‘[in the 1990s], the NATO strategy did not focus on the Bal-
tic Sea region as a priority area of potential military conflicts. The Bal-
tic Sea region used to appear on the agenda only when some inci-
dents occurred’ [8, p. 58]. 
This problem has been addressed by Russian specialists in Baltic 
studies — Nikolai Mezhevich, Gennady Fedorov, and Yuri Zverev. 
They stress that the situation changed in the late 2000s. As a result, 
                                                     
3 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015, 
No 683 ‘On the Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation’, 2015, 
Rossiyskaya gazeta. available at: https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopa 
snost-site-dok.html (accessed 07.04.2018) (in Russ.). 
4 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by the Pres-
ident of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016), 
2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (official website, 
available at: http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_ publish-
er/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248 (accessed 07.04.2018) (in Russ.). 
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‘the region, which was considered for twenty years an area of relative 
stability and rapid socioeconomic development, is evolving within 
the model of hybrid conflict, drifting towards military confrontation’ 
[9, p. 4]. Another Russian international relations expert, Konstantin 
Khudoley, concludes his analysis of the evolution of the Baltic from 
the 1990s by emphasising that ‘[d]espite the ‘turn to the East’ that 
took place during the confrontation with the West, the Euro-Atlantic 
line of Russian foreign policy will remain a priority’ [10, p. 14]. The 
international law component of the Russia‒NATO relations has been 
addressed by Igor Kuznetsov [11] and Aleksandr Nikitin [12], who 
view NATO eastern initiatives as a long-term strategy for the deep 
integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the alliance. 
Some international researchers examine these processes within a 
broader context of geopolitical changes and stress the ambitions of 
Russia and the US to secure military and political leadership [13]. For 
example, Kimberly Marten writes: ‘NATO’s expanding role in the 
Balkans and both NATO and US use of airstrikes without Russian 
consultation and approval probably mattered more than NATO’s ge-
ographic expansion in status considerations’ [14, p. 160]. 
The enlargement contributed to both the combat capability of the 
alliance and spurred its military activity. In 2002, NATO held a major 
exercise at Russian borders. First after the collapse of the USSR, it in-
volved pre-emptive nuclear strike practice [15]. The military infra-
structure of NATO was developing. In Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic, it was expanding eastward. Even civil aerodromes 
were to be repurposed. Overall, NATO was planning to engage 120 
airfields as forward deployment bases. Aerodromes in Latvia, Lithu-
ania, and Estonia gave the NATO aviation an opportunity to reach 
Russian objects east of the Volga. 
Discussions held at the Russia-NATO Council meetings, which 
was established at the summit in Rome on May 28, 2002,5 did not ease 
Russia’s concerns about the possible deployment of NATO troops 
and armaments in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This sce-
nario was viewed as likely by some Russian politicians, since the US 
was planning to redeploy part of its European troops from ‘old’ alli-
ance members (Germany) to Eastern European candidates. The pes-
simism of the Russian military was fuelled by the Baltics being very 
unlikely to join the adapted CFE Treaty.6 
The problem was that the Baltics could have joined the treaty only 
after it had come into effect, which required its ratification by the sig-
                                                     
5 Russia-NATO Council [official website], 2018, available at: https:// 
www.nato.int/nrc-website/ru/about/index.html (accessed 07.04.2018) 
(in Russ.). 
6 Author’s note: the adopted CFE Treaty was concluded at the OSCE 
summit held in Istanbul on the initiative of Russia in 1999.  
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natories to the CFE. Russia made an official proposal to the Baltics 
that the four countries should assume mutual responsibility for ‘con-
taining’ their armed forces and preventing a disproportional increase 
in their combat potentials. This proposal was not accepted [16]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. CFE territory in 2003 [17] 
 
The prospects of European security were widely discussed at the 
time. Against this background, a conference entitled North European 
Regional Integration: Challenges and Prospective Agenda was held in 
Moscow on May 31, 2003. The event focused on international rela-
tions in the Baltic Sea region, world politics, changes in the policies of 
Russia, the US, the Nordic countries, and the Baltics, the eastward en-
largement of NATO and Russia’s reaction to it, and the entering into 
force of the adapted CFE Treaty. Most speakers paid attention to soft 
security in the Baltic region and possible international collaborations 
in solving environmental, economic, social, and other problems.7 
The conference was a landmark. As its speakers emphasised, the 
international political situation had been sufficiently transformed by 
the time to expedite positive changes in the Baltic region. Enough time 
had passed from the disintegration of the USSR for the views of the 
Russian expert community and political leadership to change. The atti-
tudes of national elites towards NATO enlargement became much less 
negative. The Northern European region was expected to play the key 
role in Russia’s integration in Europe. Thus, the country demonstrated 
                                                     
7 North European Regional Integration: Challenges and Prospective 
Agenda, 2018, Research and Academic Forum on International Relations web-
site, available from: http://www.obraforum.ru/pdf/k2003program.pdf 
(accessed 24.12.2018) (in Russ.). 
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that its north-western foreign policy was aimed at ensuring stability in 
the region and creating more comfortable conditions for all the actors. 
Many speakers stressed that the favourable backdrop had been created 
by the waning of the Baltics’ concerns about the possible military pres-
sure from Russia. This was partly a result of the three countries’ im-
pending accession to NATO and the EU. 
On March 29, 2004, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joined NATO. 
This stirred up reaction from some members of the Russian military 
and political leadership: the eastward enlargement of NATO was not 
in line with the country’s interests. The expansion was perceived as 
distorting the post-war power balance in Europe. With the Baltics in 
mind, the then Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, ‘demand-
ed that NATO abandon its “anti-Russian stance” and prevent its 
members from anti-Moscow statements’ [18]. Moreover, the location 
of NATO military bases at Russian borders both was against good 
neighbourly spirit and created tension in international relations, 
which persists to this day. 
After the accession of Poland (1999) and Lithuania (2004) to NATO, 
the Kaliningrad region became even more vulnerable to external 
threats. Russia became a potential target of blackmail by neighbouring 
states, which could block maritime, air, and land connections to the 
region. The NATO rhetoric transformed the projected construction of a 
Grodno—Kaliningrad transport corridor, which was actively discussed 
in 1995—1999, into the so-called ‘Suwałki gap’. Today, the defence of 
this gap is a key priority of the alliance [9, p. 12]. 
Since Peter the Great, Russia has viewed the Baltic Sea instru-
mental in forging partnerships with European states. Russian ports in 
the shallow-water narrow end of the Gulf of Finland, which freezes in 
the winter, can be easily blocked. Thus, it is easy to understand why 
Russia is increasing its naval presence in the southern, ice-free part of 
the Baltic Sea. Obviously, with its forces in the Kaliningrad region, 
Russia both ensures the security of the region and has the opportuni-
ty to influence European security in general. Some European re-
searchers believe that further militarisation of the Baltic and the Kali-
ningrad region will lead to greater tension in the Russia—EU—
NATO relations [19]. 
Unfortunately, expectations held by some experts that the prob-
lems of military security would play a smaller role in the in-
tergovernmental relations in the Baltic Sea region have not been ful-
filled. Ivan Timofeev writes: ‘The Baltic of today is a most intricate 
area for Russia-NATO interaction. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Po-
land, all of them members of the alliance, serve as its frontier zone in 
direct contact with its Eastern neighbour’. He stresses: ‘After the 
Ukraine crisis, the Baltic turned into a most vulnerable point for esca-
lation’ [20]. 
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Similar conclusions have been drawn by Nikolai Mezhevich and 
Yuri Zverev. They consider a local military conflict as a possible sce-
nario for the Baltic [9, p. 21]. Apparently, in the early 2000s, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Poland were interested in a constructive Russia—
NATO dialogue. Primarily, this applied to political forces that did not 
have value and ideational differences with Russia. The ‘permanent 
conflict’ principle was sometimes overridden by trade-driven prag-
matic relations. For example, since May 1, 2004,8 Poland has been 
very active in implementing the eastern foreign policy strategy of the 
EU. The country has sought to strengthen its position as a major actor 
in the Russia—EU—NATO relations. This gave Poland an additional 
advantage in the dialogue with the EU leaders, especially, Germany, 
and translated in the economic benefits generated by the proximity to 
the Kaliningrad region. 
 
The Baltic region amid military escalation and political confrontation 
 
As early as 2012, Russian experts wrote that the accession of the 
Baltics to NATO did not have a dramatic effect on the post-war bal-
ance of power: ‘NATO’s military involvement in the Baltic States has 
so far failed to create an armed force capable of damaging Russia’s 
defences’ [21]. 
However, today the military and political situation in the Baltic 
region has evidently reached a new bout of tensions reminiscent of 
the mid-2000s. There are reasons to believe that this tendency will 
persist and new risks associated with military security will emerge. 
The latter may turn into military dangers and threats to national se-
curity. Below, we will discuss the facts supporting these beliefs. 
Since 2012, the numbers of NATO contingents stationed at the 
western borders of Russia have increased threefold. Today, these 
forces are ready to deploy within 30 days, compared to the earlier no-
tice period of 45 days. The US missile defence system in Europe has 
been brought to the level of initial operational readiness. 
The intensity of NATO aerial reconnaissance actions at Russian bor-
ders has increased 3.5-fold and marine reconnaissance 1.5-fold. The 
frequency of NATO military exercise at Russian borders has doubled. 
The alliance carried out 282 exercises in 2014 and as many as 548 in 
2017. Each year, over 30 military exercises are conducted at Russia’s 
western borders. Their scenarios are based on armed confrontation 
with the country.9 The Minister of Defence of Russia, Sergey Shoigu, 
commented on the outcomes of the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels: 
                                                     
8 Author’s note: the date of Poland’s accession to the EU. 
9 Expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, 2018, President of 
Russia, Official website, available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/presi 
dent/news/56472 (accessed 04.01.2018) (in Russ.). 
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‘Over 100 exercises have been held since the beginning of the year, 
with up to 80 thousand personnel involved. The numbers of person-
nel participating annually in military exercises has increased tenfold 
over the past five years and the number of combat aircraft employed 
from 11 to 101’. The Russian side was also concerned with the in-
volvement of Finland and Sweden in NATO structures [22]. 
Russian side could not ignore these developments. On April 1, 
2016, the 11th Army Corps was formed in the Kaliningrad region as 
part of the Baltic Fleet.10 In February, 2018, one of the brigades of the 
corps was equipped with Iskander-M ballistic missiles. This was con-
firmed by the Head of the State Duma Defence Committee, Vladimir 
Shamanov. He said: ‘The constantly expanding military infrastruc-
ture of foreign states near Russian national borders will become the 
first target for Russia’.11 
This statement provoked a reaction from the NATO leadership 
and the Baltic States. They insisted that the Russian side was inten-
tionally disturbing the balance. Galina Gribanova and Yuri Kosov 
write that most of the concerns of the Baltics and the alliance were 
caused by the fact that ‘[Iskander-M] missiles can carry nuclear or 
conventional warheads and have a range of 250 miles, placing Riga, 
Vilnius, and Warsaw within their reach’ [8, p. 61]. At the same time, 
the position of NATO on increasing the defence capabilities of non-
member states is obviously selective: what is permitted to some states 
is not permitted to others. 
A vivid example is the decision made at the NATO summit in 
Warsaw on July 8, 2016, to station four battalions in the Baltics and 
Poland. According to the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stol-
tenberg, this was ‘proportionate measured defensive response’ to 
Russia’s actions [23]. The summit also agreed to create a joint intel-
ligence and security division. Alongside its principal tasks of col-
lecting and analysing information, this new structure was to ensure 
the effective use of the data submitted by the alliance allies [24]. 
Another source of possible threats to Russia is the NATO decision 
to bring the Baltic region states to a new level of military pre-
paredness by granting Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia the sta-
tus of leading nations within NATO. Thus, to maintain defence capa-
bility in the northwest, Russia has to estimate the situation in real 
time and take informed military and political decisions, which, 
among other things, will require additional government spending. 
                                                     
10 Coastal defence troops of Russian Navy to be transformed into army 
corps, 2018, Flot. Com (analytical portal),a available at: https://flot. 
com/2017/%D0%92%D0%BC%D1%8415/ (accessed 04.01.2018) (in Russ.). 
11 Deputy Shamanov: Russia deployed Iskander ballistic missiles perma-
nently, 2018, Vesti.ru, available at: https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id 
=2984428 (accessed 04.01.2018) (in Russ.). 
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Intensive combat training of the military personnel of the Baltic 
NATO and the rotational deployment of aerial border patrol forces 
affected air safety in the region. In 2016, this problem merited the 
special attention of the international political leaders, including the 
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin. On his order, the country’s Min-
istry of Defence drafted proposals for increasing flight safety in the 
Baltic region. They were presented at a meeting of the Russia—
NATO Council on July 13, 2016. Following the meeting, Jens Stolten-
berg said that NATO welcomed ‘that Russia has signalled that it 
wants to pursue risk reduction measures’.12 However, the head of 
Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, continues to em-
phasise that, despite the initiative from Russia, talks have not yet tak-
en place.13 
Stoltenberg stressed that NATO has to do everything possible to 
avoid misunderstandings and incidents involving Russia and that 
Russia could not and should not be isolated. He added that, despite 
the growing military activity of NATO in Europe and at Russian bor-
ders, the alliance leadership was interested in coordinating rules for 
interactions with Russia and avoiding any misunderstandings, inci-
dents, or accidents. Nevertheless, as early as January 2017, dozens of 
US Special Operations forces arrived in Lithuania. The Director of the 
State Security Department of Lithuania, Darius Jauniškis, called the 
deployment of US troops a response to Russia’s actions: ‘NATO and 
other countries would not put up with Russia's aggression in the re-
gion’.14 Moreover, by the end of 2017, a network of advanced aero-
dromes ready to receive combat and support aircraft of the US and 
Western European air forces connected Zokniai in Lithuania, 
Lielvārde in Latvia, and Ämari in Estonia [25]. 
Earlier in 2017, the Minister of Defence of Poland, Antoni Maciere-
wicz, said that his country required a stronger US military presence: 
                                                     
12 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg follow-
ing a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, 2016, NATO, available from: 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_134102.htm?selectedL-
ocale=en (accessed 31.07.2016). 
13 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media 
questions at a news conference following the talks with Finland’s Foreign 
Minister Timo Soini, Haikon Kartano Manor, Porvoo, May 4, 2017, Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs official website, available T: http://www.mid.ru/ 
press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/con 
tent/id/2743998?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_7OvQR5KJWVmR&_101_INS 
TANCE_7OvQR5KJWVmR_languageId=en_GB (accessed 12.06.2018) (In 
Russ.). 
14 Lithuania confirms deployment of US special operators, 2017, Delfi, 
available at: https://en.delfi.lt/lithuania/defence/lithuania-confirms-
deployment-of-us-special-operators.d?id=73345104 (accessed 20.11.2017). 
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the deployment of at least two US divisions in Poland was necessary 
for the country to withstand external threats. The Sejm increased mili-
tary spending to 2.5 % of GDP. An increased defence budget is re-
quired to cope with the ‘threat coming from the East’.15 A similar 
stance was adopted by the Baltics. The defence budget of Lithuania 
reached USD 747.74 million in 2017, which is almost twice the 2005 
figure. The country is discussing the prospect of increasing military 
spending to 2.5 % of GDP.16 The defence expenditure of Estonia and 
Latvia is also growing. Statistics show that the annual increment has 
reached 15 % in recent years. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Defence budgets of the Baltics in 2016—2019, USD million17 
 
According to the official NATO report, the defence budgets of 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland reached the US administration 
requirement of 2 % of GDP. This will obviously translate into greater 
numbers of the member states’ troops.18 One might even expect the 
                                                     
15 Poland believes deployment of at least two US divisions necessary for 
its defence, 2017, Mail.ru, available at: https://news.mail.ru/politics/31 
181775/?frommail=1 (accessed 20.11.2017) (in Russ.). 
16 Lithuanian security services officer: deals with Moscow are impossible, 
2018, EADaily, available at: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/04/ 
07/litovskiy-specsluzhbist-s-rossiey-nelzya-dogovoritsya (accessed 
07.04.218) (in Russ.). 
17 Defence budgets are surging in the Baltic States by Niall McCarthy, 
2018, The Statistics Portal, available at: https://www.statista.com/ 
chart/6626/defence-budgets-are-surging-in-the-baltic-states/ (accessed 
07.04.2018). 
18 Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018), NATO, COM-
MUNIQUE PR/CP(2018)091 10 July, 2018, NATO, available at: 
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/201
80709_180710-pr2018-91-en.pdf (accessed 07.06.2018). 
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military spending targets to increase in the future. The stance adopt-
ed by the US will continue to shift the focus of the Baltics from na-
tional economic and social development to defence. Whereas, accord-
ing to Mezhevich and Zverev: ‘[i]n the understanding of this circum-
stance, the expert and scientific community of Russia relies on the 
relatively recent Soviet experience’ [26, p. 74]. 
A US missile defence base was deployed near the Polish village of 
Redzikowo 300 km away from Kaliningrad. It includes an Aegis 
Ashore missile defense system and an MK 41 vertical launch system 
equipped with Standard SM-3 Block IIA and Block IB missiles [27]. 
The military base was to be brought into full operation in 2018. How-
ever, according to Poland’s Ministry of Defence, due to technical rea-
sons, this will happen only in 2020 [28]. Some experts believe that the 
delay was rather caused by problems in the US—Polish bilateral rela-
tions and a lack of mutual trust.19 The editor-in-chief of the National-
naya oborona (National Defence) journal, Igor Korotchenko, comment-
ed on the issue: ‘The Polish government will not have access to the 
object’. He continues: ‘No one will know with what missiles the 
Americans equip their systems. These may be either anti-ballistic 
missiles or attacking missiles of the Tomahawk type. This has nothing 
to do with the Polish village and concerns the US base only’.20 
Similar arguments have been put forward by Vadim Volovoy and 
Irina Batorshina. They maintain: ‘The Baltic Republics and Poland 
have traditionally relied on the US rather than the EU for their securi-
ty, viewing the latter as a tool to improve their economic well-being’. 
They stress that ‘[c]ountries that traditionally support confrontation 
with Russia, Poland and the Baltics, serve as a conduit for Washing-
ton strategy in Europe and a cordon sanitaire. This function is imple-
mented through the Intermarium project meant to separate Russia 
from the EU’ [29, p. 18]. 
At the same time, the Chief of the Cabinet of the President of Po-
land, Krzysztof Szczerski, said in an interview to the Rzeczpospolita: 
‘Our country will become the centre of the US military activities in 
the region, an operations base for the US troops’.21 Below, he ex-
plains: ‘The idea of “Fort Trump”, which the Polish President intro-
duced to Donald Trump in Washington sought… to convince the 
                                                     
19 MSZ: baza w Redzikowie z opóźnieniem, 2018, Defence24, available at: 
https://www.defence24.pl/msz-baza-w-redzikowie-z-opoznieniem (ac-
cessed 07.04.2018). 
20 Iskander ballistic missiles to be deployed permanently in Kaliningrad 
region, 2018, Vesti.ru, available at: https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html? 
id=2953621 (accessed 07.04.2018) (in Russ.). 
21 ‘…nasz kraj stanie się centrum amerykańskiej aktywności wojskowej 
w regionie, swego rodzaju regionalną bazą operacyjną dla sił zbrojnych 
USA’. 
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Americans of the need to increase their presence in our country. It 
was a success. However, the US has a more ambitious idea: a stronger 
military presence in our country will provide not only national but 
also regional security on the stretch from Estonia to Bulgaria’.22 To-
day, 4.3 thousand US troops are stationed in Poland. This is the most 
numerous US contingent on the eastern flank and the fourth largest 
in Europe, following Germany (37.5 thousand people), Italy (12 thou-
sand people), and the UK (8.3 thousand people).23 
 
Conclusion 
 
The almost fifteen years of the Baltics’ NATO membership 
demonstrate that threat of the eastward enlargement of the alliance 
was not exaggerated. Being a voluntary hostage to the bloc politics, 
the Baltic member states of NATO have to sacrifice regional security 
and development when tensions run high. 
At the same time, Russian civilian and military officials should 
view the Baltics’ NATO membership as an opportunity to promote 
dialogue with the alliance. A priority area of cooperation is naviga-
tion and air safety in the Baltic. Collaborations in this field will un-
doubtedly contribute to regional networking and mutual trust and 
improve the tenor of the Russia—NATO partnership. Another prom-
ising avenue is the resumption of collaborations within the BALTOPS 
military exercise. Since 1993, the Russian navy had taken part in the 
manoeuvres 19 times before the NATO leadership decided to exclude 
Russia from participation in 2014. 
Paradoxical as it may seem, for Russia, minimisation of the nega-
tive consequences of the Baltics’ accession to the alliance involves 
closer military cooperation at the Russia—NATO level. This may 
prevent the emergence of actual threats and contribute to the devel-
opment of effective tools for regional cooperation. 
An analysis of international relations in the Baltic region in the 
late 20th/early 21st centuries shows the following: active military co-
operation makes the region safer for everyone. When the interests of 
regional partnerships are replaced by global political consideration, 
the military sector heightens the tensions. Politicians and military of-
                                                     
22 ‘Idea Fortu Trump, jaką polski prezydent przedstawił Donaldowi 
Trumpowi w Waszyngtonie, miała niejako… przekonać Amerykanów 
do samej idei zwiększenia zaangażowania w naszym kraju. I to się 
udało. Ale Ameryka ma jeszcze bardziej ambitną koncepcję. Chce, aby 
wzmocnienie sił w Polsce zapewniało bezpieczeństwo nie tylko naszemu 
krajowi, ale całemu regionowi, od Estonii po Bułgarię.’  
23Bielecki, J. 2019, Polska bazą USA na flance wschodniej. Rzeczpospolita, 
available at: https://www.rp.pl/Polityka/301109904-Polska-baza-USA-
na-flance-wschodniej.html (accessed 11.01.2019). 
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ficials should keep this trend in mind. The ‘keep the open door’ prin-
ciple suggests that ‘[s]tability and predictability are more likely to be 
assured if the United States and Russia resume a structured, sus-
tained dialogue about deterrence, security, and strategic stability 
more broadly. The priority should be given to discussing measures 
that NATO and Russia could take to reduce the risk of conflicts aris-
ing from an incident or miscommunication’ [30, p. 15]. Obviously, 
this principle remains relevant to this day. 
In a short-term and mid-term perspective, the conduct of Russia’s 
partners in the Baltic region will be strongly affected by the interests 
of the US, which the country promotes using the tools of global poli-
tics. In the context of the Kaliningrad problem, the military factor will 
prevail over soft security, since the latter is beyond the scope of the 
national interests of the US. Thus, the transatlantic voyage of Abram-
ses and Bradleys to the Baltic coast and the borders of the Russian 
Federation seems to be part of the US military strategy rather than an 
isolated event [31]. The scenario when the EU member states estab-
lish an independent European defence union that will forge equal 
partnerships with Russia and NATO and enter into collaborations 
with a focus on Baltic security, is not plausible [32, p. 7]. 
In taking preventive and response measures to ensure military se-
curity, Russia should claim leadership in solving the problems of soft 
security and development in the Baltic region. In other words, in the 
Baltic, Russia has to become an alternative to the US for those seeking 
long-term development based on the principle of equal partnership. 
To this end, it is important to engage all the possible tools of interna-
tional and interregional cooperation. Here, the Kaliningrad exclave 
has to play an important role. The achievement of this goal may be 
expedited by a federal policy furthering the economic development 
of the region by granting tax exemptions to international companies 
working in the region, by introducing electronic visas, and by pro-
moting cross-border cooperation. 
Overall, history shows that hegemony does not work in the re-
gion. A more promising avenue is suggested by the thesis dating 
back to the late 1950s: ‘the Baltic Sea — a Sea of Peace’ [33]. In today’s 
situation, which gives little ground for optimism, this thesis can be 
interpreted as 'better a bad peace than a good quarrel'. 
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